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ABSTRACT
The objectives of this research are: (1) to examine how the decision is made to
use a Non-Developmental Item (NDI) to meet an operational requirement; and (2) to
formulate an evaluation model that could be used by the decision maker to determine
which support method would be most suitable for the NDI in question.
In formulating the model presented in this thesis (the Support System Decision
Matrix), actual cases of NDI acquisitions were studied and the lessons learned from
these efforts were consolidated into a model. The heuristic considers system use
factors and system specific factors and ranks the four basic ways to support a system:
(1) discard system upon failure (no support), (2) total contractor support, (3) organic
support and (4) a combination of organic and contractor support.
Conclusions and recommendations focus on how the military services can field
effective systems oy using the NDI process. The NDI process often makes sense from
both an economic and a time perspective, but strict attention must be given to the
logistic support requirement for these systems when fielded.
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This thesis examines logistic support concepts for Non-Developmental Items (NDIs).
It analyzes the way to develop a logistic support strategy for NDIs. The research
focuses on how system use factors and other program characteristics will affect the
support decisions.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this study are: (1) to determine how program managers choose
an NDI to meet an operational requirement, (2) to identify the causes for logistic
support difficulties when fielding NDIs, (3) to identify the program parameters that can
suggest the most effective support program, and (4) to develop a model to aid in
determining the preferred method of support for an NDI.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In pursuing the objectives of the research, the following questions were addressed:
1. How is the decision made to use an NDI to meet an operational requirement?
2. What method best determines how to support an NDI?
3. What program parameters identify the best support program?
4. Is it possible to develop a model which will aid the program manager in
determining which support method is best suited for the acquisition?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this thesis will cover the development of the heuristic, or rles of
thumb, for choosing a satisfactory form of logistic support. This thesis will not define
adequate logistic support, but will offer a way to rank alternative methods of providing
logistic support based on a decision to use NDIs.
No factors limited the efforts of this research. This thesis focuses on the Federal
acquisition process without specifically addressing the Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System (PPBS). It is written under the assumption that the reader has a
working knowledge of the requirements and procedures involved in the acquisition and
budget process.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
The information presented in this thesis came mostly from the available literature
on the subject of system acquisition, logistic support and NDIs. The literature base
includes current acquisition directives and instructions (specifically DOD instructions
5000.1 and 5000.2 of 1 September 1987 and OMB Circular A-109 of April 1976) and
military department studies on acquisition and NDIs, and studies prepared by private
companies such as the Logistics Management Institute. Finally, program managers and
logisticians were interviewed for their personal insight of the subject.
F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The concepts of this study are based on precise definitions used in acquisition
management and logistics engineering. Appendix B is a glossary of terms and
Appendix C is a list of acronyms used in this thesis.
2
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The organization of this thesis includes an introduction, four development chapters,
and a final chapter of conclusions and recommendations. Chapter If provides an
overview of the acquisition process and a background of NDI and related logistic
support problems. Chapter III addresses the specific research questions and reviews
the Department of Defense (DOD) guidance on NDIs and logistic support. Chapter IV
presents a valuative model which can be used by a program manager as an aid in
determining a support methodology for NDIs. This model emulates a model developed
by LCDR D. S. Parry and LCDR B. R. Sellers for determining the "best method" of
selecting a second-source contractor when the current item is provided by a sole source
contractor. Chapter V is a case study of the Logistic Application of Automated
Marking and Reading Symbols (LOGMARS) program. In addition, the model
developed in Chapter IV is applied to the LOGMARS case study. Finally, Chapter VI
presents conclusions drawn from this research and provides recommendations for further
study. The appendices provide related information useful in improving the reader's
understanding of the research.
I. FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents a theoretical framework for discussing acquisition and logistic
support implications of Non-Developmental Items (NDI). It begins with a broad
overview of the acquisition process; it considers the implications of NDI on the
acquisition process and discusses some of the advantages and disadvantages of an NDI
procurement compared to a non-NDI procurement.
The government acquisition process is very complex and cumbersome. Only
through an understanding of this process and the nature of NDI's is a more specific
examination of the support of these items possible. This chapter builds a foundation
upon which to understand that process and its relationship to NDI's.
B. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
The purpose of the acquisition process is simple. It is to develop, produce, supply
and support weapon systems to achieve the operational goals of the Armed Services.
The President establishes these goals as National Security objectives and policies. The
resulting acquisition process involves making millions of procurement actions and
spending billions of dollars each year. The size of this action requires close control
and guidance.
The basic guidance for Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs comes
from the President through his Office of Management and Budget (OMB) through
Circular A-109 entitled "Major System Acquisitions" of 5 April 1976. A-109 embodies
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the recommendations of the 1972 Commission on Government Procurement to provide
a standard organization policy to the Executive branch of the Government, including
the Department of Defense (DOD).
The Department of Defense (DOD) expanded Executive guidance by developing two
additional directives. The first is Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5000.1 of
1 September 1987. Its title is "Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs."
The second is DODD 5000.2 of 1 September 1987, known as "Defense Acquisition
Program Procedures." These instructions expand A-109, and are designed to provide
a single, uniform system for planning, designing, developing, procuring, maintaining and
disposing of all equipment, facilities and services for DOD.
Identifying the precise beginning of the acquisition process is difficult. Programs
begin in a variety of ways. A new system may start as a replacement for a system
that has become obsolete. Government intelligence services may detect a new threat
or mission that requires a system different from any yet designed. Also, new
technology may emerge that forces the development of a new weapon system. Each
military department would address the requirements with plans and recommendations
through its Planning. Progranming and Budgeting System (PPBS) in documents known
as Program Objective Memorandums (POM).
Before Program Objective Memorandums are prepared and submitted through the
PPBS process, serv'ies perform an activity known as Mission Area Analysis (MAA).
i. Mission Area Anal.si,
Mission Area Analysis (MAA) is an ongoing process of identifying a perceived
threat, a change in technology, or input from operational personnel that results in a
modification to an existing weapon system or provides the opportunity to develop a
new system. Natiunal intelligence agencies may detect the presence of a new threat
to security or users may report deficiencies in current designs or performance
deficiencies of existing systems. However, most of the MAA is conducted outside the
operational community. Research and Development (R&D) centers and commercial
industry provide much of the MAA as a result of independent research and
development programs and breakthroughs in technology.
One element of MAA is market surveillance. Market surveillance is the
process of reviewing the commercial market for technology and systems that may fulfill
operational requirements. No matter how well organized, DOD cannot normally
duplicate the economies of scale possible in a mass market, nor the power of the free
market system to select and perpetuate the most innovative and efficient producers.
Due to their very nature, products developed uniquely for the military usually cost
more than their commercial counterparts. Therefore, market surveillance helps the
DOD avoid some of the costs associated with research and development efforts by
purchasing goods and services directly from the industry.
Following MAA. the mission need is formally documented in a Mission Need
Statement (MNS), an Operational Requirement (OR), or a Required Operational
Capability (ROC), which defines the need for a new or modified weapon system
capability [Ref. l:p. 6].
2. Exploration of Alternative Systems
The process of finding the concept that best meets the mission need is helped
if the requirement is described in general terms since it allows consideration of the
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widest range of possible solutions [Ref. 2:p. 17]. Once the POM or the PPBS process
identifies a deficiency in the Navy's capability to meet a mission, a Tentative
Operational Requirement (TOR) is developed. This document identifies a potential
need for a new system. The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR)
reviews the TOR for all System Commands. After the review, SPAWAR identifies the
Warfare Systems Engineer (WSE) and Warfare Systems Architecture (WSA) standards
[Ref. 3:p. 3-2]. These standards, in turn, identify the cognizant System Command for
system development. This is necessary for preparing another document known as a
Development Options Paper (DOP) which is prepared by the appropriate Systems
Command, assigned by SPAWAR.
The DOP identifies a series of system alternatives or contains a presentation
of cost-capability curves for key system parameters. The Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OPNAV) decision makers can use this information in choosing the best
concept(s) to meet the threat identified in the POM or the PPBS process. The DOP
contains information on technical issues, logistics, schedule, and cost considerations for
each proposed alternative. The DOP is the basis of the MNS. It recommends
solutions for the threat identified in the POM or the PPBS process. It is at this point
in the acquisition process that decision makers should consider using NDI's as part of
their acquisition strategy when selecting alternative systems.
3. Mission Need Statement
The Mission Need Statement (MNS) serves, for major systems, the same
purpose as the OR and ROC do for other-than-major systems. DODD 5000.2 specifies
its format. The Mission Need Statement should include the following information:
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1. The specific element of the Defense Guidance to which the system
responds.
2. The mission of the system and the expected national security threat.
3. The known alternative solutions to the threat.
4. The opportunities for cooperation with foreign nations.
5. An assessment of the technology base for the known alternatives.
6. The funding requirements.
7. Any constraints or boundary conditions, and
8. The acquisition strategy. [Ref. l:p. 3-1]
C. DEFINITION OF NDI
The 1987 National Defense Authorization Act defines NDI as:
1. Any item of supply that is available in the commercial marketplace.
2. Any previously-developed item of supply that is in use by a department or
agency of the United States, a State or local government, or a foreign
government with which the United States has a mutual defense cooperation
agreement.
3. Any item of supply described in paragraph 1. or 2. that requires minor
modification in order to meet the requirements of the procuring agency.
4. Any item of supply that is now produced that does not meet the requirements
of paragraph 1., 2. or 3. solely because the item:
a. Is not in use yet, or
b. Is not available in the commercial marketplace yet.
The DOD uses various definitions, all similar to the statutory definition. The
Army further segregates the definition into three separate categories:
1. Category A - Off-the-shelf items used in the same environment for which the
items were designed with little or no development required.
2. Category' B - Off-the-shelf items used in an environment different from that
for which the items were designed.
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3. Categnry C - Integration of existing components and essential engineering
effort to accomplish systems integration with research and development to
integrate systems.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines "commercial product" as:
A product, such as an item, material, component, subsystem, or system, sold or
traded to the general public in the course of normal business operations at prices
based on established catalog or market prices.
The FAR defines "commercial-type product" as:
A commercial product (a) modified to meet some government-peculiar physical
requirement or addition, or (b) otherwise identified differently from its normal
commercial counterparts.
D. MILESTONE PROCESS
1. Milestone 0--Concept Exploration/Definition Phase
In the acquisition process, milestones are decision points along the development
path that lead to production and deployment of a weapon system. The decision to
move to the next phase is based on whether or not the system has successfully
completed the preceding phase. Figure 1 is an overview of the milestone process.
At Milestone 0, the Mission Need Statement has been approved to start a new
program. It is the first major decision point in the life-cycle of the new system and
signifies the beginning of the Concept Exploration/Definition (CE/fD) Phase.
The Concept Exploration/Definition phase is a busy time in a system's life
cycle. The Service normally establishes a program office within 90 days of the start
of this phase to develop, produce, deploy and support a weapon -vstem The program
manager assembles a team to select alternative concepts and writes an acquisition
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concepts with the greatest potential of meeting the mission need identified during MAA
and documented in the MNS.
The program office completes the Concept Exploration/Definition (CE/D) phase
in cooperation with industry, in-house Navy Research and Development (R&D)
laboratories, universities, and contract research centers. The program office selects
alternative concepts based on factors such as life cycle cost, development schedules,
and performance characteristics. Most of the alternatives under consideration come
from industry and the government uses in-house laboratories and research centers to
review and evaluate concepts that have been submitted. The selection of the best
concepts is based on their feasibility, technical risk, and cost tradeoffs.
a. Market Research and Analysis
Market research and analysis consists of researching the market for
technology that is available to meet the user's need. On this subject, the FAR, part
11 states:
Once the Government's needs have been functionally described, market research
and analysis shall be conducted to ascertain the availability of commercial products
to meet those needs and to identify the market practices, including warranty terms,
of firms engaged in producing, distributing, and supporting these products.
Agencies shall conduct market research and analysis as needed to assure adequate
competition and that the Government's needs are met in a cost effective manner.
The extent of market research and analysis will vary depending upon such factors
as urgency, estimated dollar value, complexity, and past experience.
When products meeting detailed specifications have satisfied user needs in the
past, solicitations for commercial or commercial type products to fill the same
requirement should include provisions allowing the former producers to be
considered for award under the detailed specifications as long as the specifications
are current and all potential suppliers are competing on a similar basis.
One way to do this is for the program office to award several contracts
to evaluate the concepts that max' meet the need. A successful CEfD should, therefore,
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uncover all NDI products and technologies available to satisfy the need. It also has
a potential secondary benefit of shortening the acquisition process. In order for the
NDI to meet that need, the following questions should be addressed:
1. Are there one or more NDI products available to satisfy a user's need?
If none are suitable, can an item be modified or can the requirement
be relaxed without degrading performance?
2. Can an NDI meet the performance requirements of a military tactical
environment?
3. Are available products efficiently transportable on highway, marine craft,
railroad, and aircraft in their operational configurations?
4. Are there suitable products available in enough quantities to meet
government requirements without separate production runs?
5. Are there support systems, including parts and backup capabilities that
satisfy government needs available for the life of the system? What if
the contractor producing the NDI goes out of business?
6. What is the extent of competition for the item under consideration?
7. Are commercial standards and warranties adequate to protect the
Government's interest?
8. Are commercial training, operating and maintenance manuals available
and adequate?
9. Do companies making the NDI have a good product quality and
logistics history?
10. Is the vendor willing to demonstrate the item at a government location?
11. Does the NDI incorporate accepted human factors engineering features?
12. Are commercial configuration management controls adequate?
13. Does the NDI meet safety, health and environment requirements?
14. Is the NDI disposable (e.g., disposal of hazardous wastes)?
15. Is there a structure in place for post-production support of NDI? If not,
what will the maintenance requirements be and who will satisfy them:
organic, commercial, mix? [Ref. 2:p. 201
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16. Does the NDI provide more than the user requirement at any cost to
the Government? Is the ND! available in various configurations?
17. Does the NDI allow for any growth in capability, capacity,
performance?
The results of early market research will shape the entire acquisition
strategy.
b. Acquisition Strategy
The "Acquisition Strategy" is the program manager's plan for satisfying
the user's need. The plan contains elements such as: program structure, requirements
thresholds, priorities, resource availability, and who will have program review and
decision authority. The use of an NDI in the acquisition strategy is impacted by these
elements. For an NDI procurement, these elements fall into three categories--technical
factors, business factors, and support factors.
Technical factors include methods for modifying the basic product, a
description for soliciting vender proposals, the use of non-government standards for
describing quality requirements of the NDI, criteria for technical evaluation, and
requirements for a technical data review.
The acquisition strategy must also make effective use of the available
financial and commercial resources. Factors associated with the use of resources are
considered business factors. Business factors for the NDI include the most favorable
delivery quantities over time, the acceptability of commercial qualification and quality
assurance practices, special warrantee requirements, the distribution system. customer
services, and the adequacy of packaging. handling, storage and transportation.
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Support factors for NDI's include the distribution system for spare parts,
a maintenance concept for the entire system that capitalizes on existing facilities and
equipment, and an incentive system for commercial repair to minimize cost.
The program office must study the NDI solution carefully to determine
how government use differs from its commercial use. Many times, government use
will involve stressing the system in ways that the manufacture never envisioned.
Therefore, an NDI solution may result in more logistic problems than it is worth.
c. Integrated Logistic Support Requirements
Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) activities must also be considered early
in the development of a weapon system, especially where an NDI solution is being
considered. The original system designer normally performs many ILS activities during
CE/D. In using an NDI solution, the program manager does not have time to do a
complete Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) and build a logistics program since the time
between the signing of the contract and the deliver) of an NDI is often accelerated.
The Government will normally rely heavily on the contractor, therefore, the program
office must carefully review the logistics costs associated with an NDI.
The document used to record logistic support considerations is known as
an Integrated Logistic Support Plan (ILSP). An ILSP is a key factor in successfully
fielding and ,pporting a system. It covers all the logistic activities for the life of the
system, such as identifying training requirements, listing necessary support equipment
and indicating calibration requirements for the system. These and many other logistic
support elements become an agenda for building a support program for the weapon
system,
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Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) is a process that applies various
techniques and functions to make sure that the system designer considers three
important logistic functions--maintainability, reliability and supportability. These
functions must be demonstrated. Maintainability is a characteristic of system design
and installation and is formally defined as the probability that a system or item can be
retained in, or restored to, a "ready for service" condition through maintenance. It is
measured by a factor called Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). Reliability is the duration
or probability of failure-free performance under stated conditions. It is measured by
a factor called Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). Supportability is the degree to
which appropriately skilled persons, training, and resources are in place to minimize
logistics-related delays within the maintenance process. Supportability is measured by
a factor called Mean Logistics Delay Time (MLDT). These three factors form the
basis of Operational Availability, which is a measure of readiness. It is the ratio of
up-time to up-time plus down-time. MTBF is a measure of up-time and down-time
is the sum of MTTR and MLDT. Therefore, Operational Availability is MTBF divided
by the sum of MTBF, MTTR and MLDT. System readiness objectives and thresholds
serve as the basis for evaluating the success of logistic support analysis planning. It
is also the basis for making improvements to a weapon system if the objectives and
thresholds are not reached.
Maintenance planning is the foundation for all other maintenance-related
support planning. It must reflect design features in the maintenance concept. It is the
process conducted to evolve and establish maintenance concepts and requirements for
the life of the system. It also translates the maintenance approach into maintenance
15
task requirements that will ensure the required availability of the system or equipment.
For example, if an equipment has no ability to identify a suspected cause when it fails
--no built-in-test capability--maintenance planning should identify a maintenance task
to isolate the failure and list the tools needed to complete this task.
Manpower and training considerations must also receive special
consideration in the logistic planning. The specific requirements for maintenance and
support personnel are determined as part of the LSA process. This, in turn, drives the
requirements for recruiting and training persons to support the system.
Another critical concern is supply support. Supply support includes the
spare parts and the associated inventories necessary for maintenance of the system.
Requirements are based on the maintenance level where repair is performed, the
geographical location where spare/repair parts are stocked, demand rates and inventory
levels of the spares, procurement lead times and the methods of distribution.
Support equipment is another important element of logistic support. These
requirements must be identified early in the acquisition process. These include
selecting calibration standards and tolerances, identifying the prime equipment functions
that will be measured and repaired, and the intended maintenance environment. This
allows the program manager to make funds available for buying this type of equipment
and getting it to the maintenance and support facilities in time to use it.
Finally, the program manager must address the transportability
requirements for the system. The program office must consider the methods for
transporting and handling the system from the producer to the user. This includes
consideration of temperature range, vibration and shock, and humidity experienced in
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transportation, the possibility of equipment degradation, and whether the system can be
easily disassembled, packed, and transported from one location to another. In the
DOD, logistics is an international business, and transportation requirements often
involve the worldwide distribution of supplies. Therefore, the system may require
unique packaging or specialized environmentally controlled containers for transportation.
The logistic tasks for a program will vary with the requirements and the
specific need of the user. Program managers must provide certain minimum
requirements for any program. The logistic support considerations are very different
for an NDI than for a purely government developed system. The specific differences
are discussed in Chapter Ill.
d. System Concept Paper
The System Concept Paper (SCP) summarizes the results of the Concept
Exploration/Definition phase and nominates the best concept(s) to be tested and
demonstrated in the next acquisition phase. The SCP also discusses the rational for
eliminating concepts that have been deemed inappropriate, technically risky or too
expensive to develop.
E. CONCEPT PRO()IA)I PHASE
The selection of a concept and approval to move into the Concept Prove-out Phase
is a key event in the acquisition of an NDI. The Concept Prove-Out Phase replaces
Concept Demonstration and Validation (CD&V) and the Full Scale Development (FSD)
phases that are normally associated with non-NDl acquisitions. Primary considerations
during Concept Prove-out Phase are (1) program alternative trade-offs, (2)
performance/cost and schedule trade-offs. (3) appropriatenesq of acquisition strategy, (4)
17
demonstration of the system or selected system components, (5) affordability and life-
cycle costs, (6) potential common-use solutions and (7) cooperative development
opportunities.
Once the acquisition strategy approves the use of an NDI, the program office then
attempts to procure it. If the buying agency is procuring a Category I NDI--an item
available from the commercial marketplace, without modification--the prove-out phase
will attempt to demonstrate the availability factors of the selected item. The factors
normally demonstrated are MTBF and MTR. For NDIs modified for military use, the
Prove-out Phase will also include testing and demonstration of the NDI until it meets
the goals established during CE/D.
At the close of the Concept Prove-Out Phase, a production decision is reported in
a document known as a Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP). It establishes the need
for a production contract. Following the solicitation of contractors, proposals are
evaluated using pre-established selection criteria. The final selection of a contractor
should be based on a proposal that provides the best value to the Government, meaning
that selection should be based on life cycle costs of the item.
F. PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT
Once the contract is awarded and the NDI is pending delivery, the program
manager must update the ILSP to ensure that the fielded system can be supported.
Details of the ILSP will be discussed in detail in Chapter III.
Initial Operating Capability (IOC) is the point in time when the system can be
operated and supported by the users. The transition process from production to
operational use is a critical time in a program. The system. its ancillary equipment and
18
the logistic support must all be in place at the same time. The goal is to meet user
requirements and to provide an operational system that is ready to go at the required
time.
The period of transition will vary in time depending on the complexity of the
system. Its success depends on how well the ILSP has been prepared and updated as
production begins. If the system is relatively simple to install, operate, and maintain,
the transition may require only a few days before the user is able to assume fuU
responsibility for system operation and support. On the other hand, if the system is
large and complex, the transition may be much longer and accomplished on a gradual
basis.
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter described the Department of Defense acquisition process and addressed
the NDI solution as an alternate acquisition strategy. It explains the similarities and
differences between an NDI acquisition strategy and one using normal development.
It also sets the foundation for examining the specifics of the research questions
discussed in Chapter III.
1 ()
11. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Chapter 1 established a theoretical framework for the acquisition of Non-
Developmental Items (NDI). This chapter examines the potential benefits of using NDI
in that process. It also addresses special support considerations for NDI systems. It
concludes by presenting the program parameters that indicate the type of support
program that will work best for NDI systems. Responses received in interviews and
through examination of acquisition literature are the basis of this chapter. Appendix
A lists the questions asked during personal interviews.
A. NON-DEVELOPMENTAL ITEM DEFINITION
When asked to define the term "Non-Developmental Item" (NDI), those interviewed
gave a fairly consistent answer. The answers were very similar to the definition
presented in Chapter U. The simple definition of an NDI is "any item or equipment
in which the user did not participate in its development". Using this definition, an
item developed for one agency can be an NDI for another.
Another important aspect is how the acquisition of an NDI differs from a typical
research and development acquisition. The consensus of those interviewed was that an
NDT is not a separate process. hut a tailoring of events within the acquiiition process.
NDI items should be one of the first alternatives considered as a solution to a material
need, however.
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B. HOW IS THE DECISION MADE TO USE NDI IN MEETING A MISSION
NEED?
The decision to use an NDI to meet a mission need is not always difficult. Some
requirements can only be met by an NDI. For example, The Army's Communications-
Electronics Command (CECOM) at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, adopted an NDI
philosophy as its first choice in providing communications and electronics equipment
for the Army. In this case, CECOM decided that all requirements must be met by off-
the-shelf items [Ref. 4:p. 351. The acquisition concentrated on finding the best
commercial market solution to meet the mission need and they chose an NDI strategy
because the expense of developing a system for the Army's unique needs was not
perceived as being cost effective.
When the acquisition process identifies the need for a new hardware system, the
acquisition process begins with the necessary requirement documents, including those
which address the use of NDI candidates. The Tentative Operational Requirement
(TOR) starts the material acquisition process by explaining how the system will be
used, where it will be employed in the field, and how it is to interface with other
systems. Although the program sponsor is responsible for the development of the
TOR, the program manager is also actively involved. The program sponsor is assigned
from one of the 13 Resource Sponsors located in the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OPNAV). The Resource Sponsor develops program appraisals for their
perspective programs and are responsible for ensuring that their programs are effective,
balanced and operated within fiscal controls. They also coordinate with other sponsors
as required The program manager is responsible to the Resource Sponsor for
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managing the specific program to which he is assigned. He uses the TOR as a basis
for conducting market research of available technology.
Together they define and identify the essential operational characteristics that are
incorporated into the Decision Options Paper (DOP), which essentially responds to the
TOR. The program sponsor then selects recommendations from the program manager
that best matches desired capabilities within affordability limits. This is the point in
the program where an NDI can be selected as the alternative.
The Operational Requirement (OR) is the document that describes the characteristics
of the alternative selected. The program sponsor prepares the OR in coordination with
the program manager.
The program office determines tradeoffs in capabilities or characteristics in the OR.
Both the sponsor and program manager must work together to formulate optimal system
requirements.
1. Benefit to Acquisition Process
An NDI solution certainly affects Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition
programs. The overall effect varies from case to case. In each instance, the NDI
acquisition offers some advantages and some disadvantages as an acquisition strategy.
The benefits attributed to NDI include lower development costs, shorter acquisition
cycles and speeding up the delivery of new technology to the field. This section shall
present some of the benefits of including NDIs in the acquisition process.
a. Lower Life Cycle Costs
NDIs are normally cheaper in the long run than systems developed
exclusively for the Government. The lower life cycle costs of NDIs are due mainly
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to cost avoidance during the research and development phases of the acquisition
process. An NDI usually costs less for three reasons: limited government R&D costs,
the use of commercial specifications, and competition within the commercial market
place.
The NDI strategy uses test and performance data provided by commercial
manufacturers, users, and other Services, agencies or countries. This data must prove
that the product is acceptable for the intended military application. As a result, limited
testing is normally required to capture this benefit. Independent evaluators such as
laboratories and research centers are often used to validate performance capabilities.
Commercial specifications often save many acquisition dollars. They save
the Government costly development of test and historical data, technical publications,
drawings, manufacturer's part information, quality, safety, and reliability data.
There is no question that many military systems must operate in environments
never encountered in the civilian sector, and the Service's demand for reliability far
exceed those of most business/industrial applications. However, in many cases,
the military specifications under which items are obtained significantly exceed those
realistically required for the item to function in its intended role. If specifications
can be reduced to the point where a commercial "off-the-shelf" item will work,
significant savings can be obtained. [Ref. 5:p. 16]
Competition also helps to keep the cost of NDIs down. Many studies
have shown that competitive pressures lead directly to the development of better
systems at lower prices. Competition arises when markets have many buyers and
sellers. Each buyer and seller is so unimportant in the market that their separate
actions have no impact on market price. Unlike a typical acquisition process, NDI is
uniquely structured to take advantage of the competitive forces in the market place.
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The Government becomes another buyer in a market with many customers and many
suppliers.
The program manager can project funding requirements more accurately
when NDIs are part of the acquisition strategy. NDI programs stay on budget because
they are theoretically off-the-shelf with prices that are firm. The program manager
projects a schedule and a budget with minimum risk of being wrong. And since the
NDI is a production item, the contractor and government team can concentrate on ways
to reduce costs instead of worrying about typical development and test problems.
b. Shorter Acquisition Cycle
As depicted in Figure 2. the NDI acquisition life-cycle model takes an
average of two and one-half years. This compares to the classical research and
development cycle that can take up to 16 years for a major new system. [Ref. 6 :p. 2]
An NDI strategy saves time in the overall acquisition cycle of a weapon system. The
real difference with NDI is that Concept Demonstration and Validation and Full Scale
Development phases can be combined when a total NDI procurement is undertaken.
This compresses a four to nine year cycle into a one to two year "prove-out" phase.
Once the program manager selects an NDI strategy, the second phase of
the standard acquisition life cycle is skipped or compressed. This is due to the fact
that the developer has already accomplished the R&D engineering, design, integration,
integrated logistic support, and test and evaluation efforts.
At times, the full-scale development phase of the standard acquisition
cycle may also be eliminated. By definition, the NDI will have confirmed the
integration of sub-systems into the production process. In the case where the
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manufacturer must modify the NDI to meet the military requirement, the time frame
of this phase is still reduced. The system developer must only demonstrate the
capabilities of the modified NDI.
~CLASSICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
8 - 16 YEARS,
2 YRS 2-3 YRS 2-6 YRS 2-5 YRS
CONCEPT CONCEPT FULL SCALE FULL RATE
EXP[.ORATION/ DEMONSTRATION/ DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTION/
DEFINITION VALIDATION INITIAL
DEPLOYMENT
1 YR NONE 1-2 YRS 9 MOS-2 YRS
/A/
NDI ACQUISITION
.. 2 1/2 - 5 YEARS
Figure 2. Acquisition Life Cycle Model.
The NDI acquisition also helps the program manager in the very important
arca of schedulinig. Since the product is already realized, scheduling, testing and
production is more certain thai under a typical research and development process.
C. State-of-the-Art Technology
One additional effect of shortening the acquisition cycle is that current
technology reaches the field sooner than under a normal acquisition. The long
development cycles of major weapon systems almost guarantees that the fielded system
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is three to five generations behind commercial systems in state-of-the art technology.
This shortcoming is especially evident in technical fields such as electronics.
d. Maintain the Production Base
The Government's industrial mobilization base consists of government-
owned facilities and equipment and the supporting of private sector industry. NDI
procurement broadens this private sector base and increases the number of defense
contractors with limited government investment.
The manufacturer designs the NDI for the commercial world. When the
military selects NDI to meet its operational requirement, demand for the item increases
and the producer of the NDI would increase its production capacity to meet the greater
demand. In the event of a mobilization, this extra capacity could prove vital to the
nation's war effort.
e. Promotes Equipment Commonality
Buying commercial systems in use by another Service or nation enhances
equipment commonality. When several government agencies buy the same NDI, the
Government receives the benefits of commonality. The benefits include lower unit
costs and lower support costs.
Equipment commonality decreases the logistics requirement for its users.
Basic Ordering Agreements--which are contracts that set the terms and conditions for
routine transactions that occur often enough to justify this flexible document--with the
developer can achieve lower prices for spare parts and training materials for the
Government. The lower prices save money for all agencies.
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f. Complies with Statutes, Regulations
Many laws, instructions and directives establish a regulatory preference for
NDIs. Studies of the DOD acquisition program commissioned by the President and the
Congress have all recommended the increased use of NDIs. The appearance of waste
and inefficiency can be less when the Government procures an NDI. However, a
program manager must always keep cost, schedule and performance in perspective, and
an NDI may not be the best alternative.
2. Detriment to Acquisition Process
NDI procurement is not a panacea for all acquisitions. NDI procurement poses
some problems not associated with full development programs. Some of these
problems are now presented.
a. Shorter Service Life
Many government funded developed systems have expected life cycles of
20 to 30 years. In the commercial market, the time horizon is much shorter and
manufacturers do not always design equipment that will meet government needs.
Another factor in the shorter life cycle of NDIs is the difference between
the military and commercial environment. The military environment is much more
harsh than the normal commercial market place. Accepting a commercial NDI to fulfill
a military requirement often means accepting equipment that is less rugged and will
require some modification.
b. Compromised User Requirements
To take advantage of the cost savings offered by NDI, the program office
often tailor- the user's requirements. however they must guard against relaxing essential
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standards to accommodate commercial equipment. Conversely, trading off unrealistic
specifications for substantial savings in time and costs is the backbone of the NDI
program.
Many programs suffer from "requirements creep." Care in preparation of
the original operational requirements is a must in order to avoid "add on" requirements
as the system is developed. The OR must reflect neither the minimum essential
requirements nor the maximum desired features. The OR must reflect the requirements
necessary to meet the mission need.
c. Increased Safety Concern
NDIs create increased concern regarding safety. This is due to the
relaxation of testing before acceptance by the military. By its nature, the NDI is a
system whose development the Government has not participated in. It is an item
selected for a military application based on its commercial use. The program manager
must adapt the item to a military application in a very short time since one of
objectives of using an NDI strategy is to shorten the acquisition process. All these
aspects place a considerable strain on the program office to meet both of these
objectives.
NDls generate a second safety concern because they may not meet
Military Specification (MILSPEC) and Military Standard (MILSTD) requirements.
Many of the requirements contained in these specifications are designed to assure DOD
that safety and quality requirements have been thoroughly tested. Commercial
specifications typically contain less safety and quality testing requirements. This is not
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to say that items built to commercial specifications are not safe or lack any quality but
documentation is not available and therefore, further testing is required.
d. Less Time for Logistics
Logistic Support Analysis is the process of integrating and applying
various techniques to make sure system design considers supportability requirements.
An NDI approach surrenders part of this responsibility to the commercial developer.
As a result, the buying activity must often rely on the developer for support after it
is fielded.
3. Detriment to Logistic Support
Logistic sup- r consideration for NDIs is the subject of this thesis. NDI
programs are spe .dt because they can shorten the acquisition cycle. Selection of
certain commercial items also reduces the interval between production award and initial
deliv, ry of the entire system to the user. The time required to prepare, staff, and
approve program management documents, manpower estimates, and equipment
authorization documents included in the establishment of an organic logistic support
capability is often greater than the time actually required to produce and deploy
hardware. When the process is accelerated through the procurement of an NDI, timely
support is even more difficult to accomplish.
a. Hardware and Software Proliferation
The Government relying on the commercial market may purchase different
systems to meet the same needs of two different agencies. For the purposes of
illustration, consider the office typewriter. Many commercial firms manufacture
typewriters. If a government agency had a requirement for one, it certainly would not
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develop it from a typical R&D approach. Instead, the agency would buy it directly
from a manufacturer and save unnecessary R&D costs. But unless the agency specified
some level of compatibility with its existing typewriters, they may end up buying a
model that is not compatible with typewriters currently in use. This, in turn, causes
a logistic support problem. The agency would have to buy and stock two different
types of ribbons for these models. They would also require different repair services
depending on which typewriter needed maintenance. Two types of typewriters may not
seem too difficult to manage, but consider an office with hundreds of them to support.
Hardware and software proliferation is another example where systems are
compatible or interchangeable and readiness is impacted. Standardization of equipment
is an important consideration when one considers the impact it will have on repair
parts. A Form Fit and Function (F3) philosophy fits nicely into the NDI process. It
says that requirements can be described in functional terms such as speed, range,
weight and other performance characteristics. Therefore, NDIs that meet those
requirements could be purchased. Unfortunately it also presents logistics problems
when various systems need support. For example, a ship with two or three different
types of fire pumps procured under a F3 specification would be more difficult to
support then if standard equipment were purchased. In this example, the ship is forced
to carry several different groups of spare parts to support on board equipment. If the
same NDI were purchased as the standard fire pump, logistics support is much easier
to accommodate.
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b. No Time for Logistic Support Analysis (LSA)
As mentioned earlier, a shorter development results when procuring NDIs
and therefore, there is too little time for a formal LSA. The Government must then
perform an abbreviated LSA or rely on the NDI developer for this analysis. An
example of this problem is described in detail in Chapter V. The Logistics
Applications of Automated Marking and Reading Symbols (LOGMARS) system was
procured from Ibis Corporation. Delivery of the equipment began almost immediately
after the contract was awarded. The program had many logistic support difficulties in
the first years of use as a result fielding an NDI without proper support.
C. WHAT SPECIAL SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR
NDI?
In addition to spare parts problems, the fielding of NDIs can leae • other logistic
support problems. For example, training personnel to operate and sup, a system can
also be a problem. Efforts to overcome this problem must begin early in the
development process so that operators and maintainers are ready to support fielded
systems. Once again, the use of NDIs force the program manager to an accelerated
decision.
The last special consideration of using NDIs is the availability of support items for
the duration of its life cycle. Market research and analysis must assess the
manufacturer's ability to sustain support over the life of the system. The program
manager may choose to make a one time "life of type" buy of support items as the
best support strategy for the system. A "life of type" buy is a one-time purchase of
spare parts. designed to support a system for the remainder of its anticipated life.
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For example, the Navy's Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) for repairing electronic and
avionic "black boxes" makes great use of commercial test equipment. Equipment that
has many common purposes such as oscilloscopes and volt meters are purchased off
the shelf from commercial vendors and installed into the ATE. Many times, the
manufacturers of these components have several upgrades to their systems. They
usually provide spare parts and technical service for their equipment for several years
after the model year, but the support usually cuts off much earlier than the normal
10 to 15 year life of ATE. In the case where a manufacturer stops supporting a
commercial item embedded in a piece of Navy ATE, the program manager would be
forced to choose between a "life of type" purchase of spare parts, a block upgrade to
the new model or select a replacement system. No matter what the choice, it will be
an expensive decision.
D. WHAT PROGRAM PARAMETERS ARE THE BEST INDICATORS FOR
CHOOSING A SUPPORT PROGRAM?
There are four basic ways to support systems. The first is No Support (NS) or
discard at failure. The second method is Organic Support (OS), where the Government
assumes all the risk of system failure. In other words, the Government would purchase
all the elements of logistics required to repair any possible failure of the system. The
third is Total Contractor Support (TCS). A TCS decision results in the Government
paying a contractor to bear the burden of keeping the system in an operational
condition. The fourth method is to have some mix of contractor or organic support.
Chapter IV contains a detailed explanation of these methods.
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Two factors influence the support method selected decision. The first are system
use factors; i.e., how, where, when, why and how long the system will be used. The
second factors are system specific. These would include the system's availability, unit
cost, population, complexity and maintenance concept. An explanation of these factors
follows.
1. System Use Factors
a. How Is The System Used?
This factor reflects the degree of militarization. As the military version
differs more and more from the commercial version, the benefits of NDI diminish.
Also, the logistic support becomes more difficult. As the degree of militarization
increases, the need for an organic support system increases.
b. Where Is The System Used?
This factor describes the environment in which the NDI operates. Hostile
or benign are the two cxtreme environments. The system maintenance plan also
addresses this factor. The closer the military environment is to the commercial
environment, the more the military can rely on the commercial method of support.
c. How Long Is The System Used?
This factor reflects the length of the operating cycle for the system. The
operating cycle drives the system's reliability. Longer operating cycles require systems
with higher reliability. Since systems with higher reliability typically cost more and
are more complex, they also need organic support. Therefore, longer operating cycles
typically drive the system to an organic support requirement.
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d. When Is The System Used?
This factor asks if the NDI supports a requirement now or in the future.
Requirements that must be met now will be met by systems without organic support.
Organic support is easier to establish for requirements projected into the future.
e. Why Is The System Used?
This factor depicts the mission criticality of the system. Is the system a
back up for another system? Is the system essential to the combat mission of the user?
If a system failure does not impact the routine of the user, the support of the system
will be different from a system who's mission is essential to the user's success.
2. System Specific Factors
A model that determines the optimal method of logistic support for an NDI
must consider more than system use factors. The model must also consider the unique
characteristics of the system. These characteristics are System Specific Factors. A
description of these factors is now presented.
a. System Availability Goals
System Availability is the measure of the degree to which a system is
operational. It describes a system's ability to start a mission when needed. It does
not, however, describe the system's endurance. Availability is a function of operating
time (reliability) and down-time (maintainability and supportability).
System reliability is the probability that a system will perform
satisfactorily for a given time period when used under specified conditions. System
maintainability is an inherent design characteristic dealing with the ease, accuracy,
safety, and economy in the performance of maintenance functions. System
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supportability relates to the degree to which the system can be supported. The system
is supported by both the inherent characteristics of system design and the effectiveness
of the overall support capability.
b. System Cost
System cost is Life Cycle Cost (LCC). LC(" includes research and
development costs, production and construction costs, operation and maintenance costs,
and system retirement and phase out costs. Two broad categories segregate LCC.
They are recurring costs and non-recurring costs. Recurring costs are the costs for
each procured system. Non-recurring costs are those costs necessary to build the first
system. Non-recurring costs include the R&D costs and portions of the other costs not
attributable to individual units.
Recurring costs are those LCC attributable to individual units. These costs
along with the maintenance costs will impact the maintenance concept of the system.
The maintenance concept defines the logistic support of the system.
c. System Population
System population or the total number of systems effects the logistic
support of that system. As the population increases, maintenance and support should
become easier.
d. System Complexity
System complexity describes the degree of interdependency of system
components. System complexity affects the maintainability and supportability of the
system. As a system becomes more complex, maintenance on the system becomes
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more difficult. A complex system is more difficult to support than a less complex
system.
e. System Maintenance Concept
Maintenance can be performed at one of three levels: Organizational,
Intermediate, or Depot. Descriptions of the tasks associated with these levels of
maintenance are contained in Chapter V. The maintenance concept defines levels of
maintenance where repair of the system affects LCC. Maintenance is normally cheaper
at lower levels. The lowest level is maintenance at the organizational level such as the
shipboard or squadron level. Systems repaired at higher maintenance levels like
Intermediate Maintenance Activities or Depots usually have higher maintenance costs
and higher LCC.
These are the factors that the program manager must consider when
choosing a support method for any system. In an NDI procurement, the program
manager must make a special effort to chose the correct support method because the
shortened acquisition cycle does not allow for development of a normal support system.
If the program office picks an organic method or an organic/contractor mix, it will
need to invest time and effort early in the program to make sure that an appropriate
support system is in place by the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of the system.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter addressed the research questions of this thesis. It uses information
gathered from interviews with logistic managers of current programs and a review of
the current acquisition literature. The factors identified as indicators for choosing a
support program will be the basis for the support decision model in Chapter TV.
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Persons interviewed answered the questions contained in Appendix A. The information
they provided made the foundation of this chapter. The support decision model in
Chapter IV also contains information gained from these interviews.
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IV. THE SUPPORT SYSTEM DECISION MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest challenges facing the military officer is to meet the growing
need for more effective and efficient management of our resources. The requirenent
to increase overall productivity in a resource-constrained Navy has placed emphasis on
all aspects of program management, and logistics has assumed a major role comparable
to research, design, production and system performance during operational use. The
need to address total system life cycle cost (in lieu of acquisition cost only) is evident,
and experience has shown that logistic support is a major contributor to life cycle cost.
Further, experience has indicated that a great deal of the impact on the projected
life cycle cost for a given system or product stems from decisions made during the
early stages of advanced system planning and conceptual design. Decisions at this
point have a major effect on activities and operations in all subsequent phases of the
life cycle. Figure 3 depicts how these decisions impact life cycle costs (LCC). In
Figure 3 the upper line shows the impact of decisions on life cycle costs and the lower
line shows cumulative system expenditures. The concept chosen to meet the mission
need is seen to lock in approximately 70 percent of the system's LCC. However, at
the point when the concept is chosen, shown as Milestone 1 in the figure, only a small
amount of the system's total LCC have been expended [Ref. 3:p. 1-91. Given the
cause-and-effect relationships and the fact that logistics costs may assume major
38
proportions, it is essential to address logistic support issues in the early phases of the
system planning and design.
Non-Developmental Items offer no opportunity for logistics to impact design.
Program managers for these systems must decide as early as possible in the program
which support method to use for their program. This model may help the program
manager or the logistician: (1) to support the system or provide no support, and (2)
which support method is best suited to the given situation. The Support System
Decision Model (SSDM) is based on a decision model developed by LCDR D.S. Parry
and LCDR B.R. Selers for selecting second production sources under sole source
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Figure 3. System Life Cycle
The following topics will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter: methods
of supporting NDIs. factois affecting the support decision. and. the model itself. This
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includes its format, the rationale behind the effectiveness factors of the model, and a
discussion of the actual use of the model.
B. METHODS OF SUPPORTING NDI SYSTEMS
This section discusses four methods which can be used to provide logistic support
for a Non-Developmental Item. Each method has advantages and disadvantages. The
four methods described are: (1) discard system and equipment upon failure (no
support); (2) total contractor support; (3) organic support; and (4) a combination of
organic and contractor support. When possible, the decision regarding the support
method should be made as early as possible in the life of the program so that the
production contracts may be structured to facilitate the purchase of support items or
engineering data. If the program manager chooses to delay the support system
decision, he may encounter a significant logistic support problem when the system is
fielded.
1. No Support (NS)
This support method works by not repairing equipment regardless of the type
failure. Upon failure, the user replaces the system with a spare. Items designated to
receive this method of support are called "non-repairable items." This support method
is also known as "throw-away" maintenance. This name applies, even if the item may
be repaired (i.e., repair is possible, but the person deciding the maintenance concept
has chosen not to repair the system.)
A non-repairable system is usually modular in construction. Also, failure
modes are such that the failed component is easily identified. In other words, fault
detection and fault isolation are easy. In this case, a positive built in unit self test
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capacity will be important. It must have a high self test thoroughness to confirm
failures before discarding the system. Otherwise, when a user suspects a failure, he
may throw away a unit that has not failed. This could be costly.
Another typical characteristic of a throw-away system is its relatively low cost.
But low system cost does not necessarily drive a system to a throw-away maintenance
concept.
Another system attribute that helps the no-repair method is easily removable
sub-components. Since the user discards the system when it fails, techniques like
hermetically-sealed components are not a problem. These reliability-enhancing methods
that protect against humidity and corrosion also improve the reliability of the unit.
Also, there is no need for internal accessibility, test points, plug-in sub-assemblies or
sub modularization or other maintainability enhancements. No trade-offs between
reliability and maintainability are required.
This support method requires minimal logistic support. No lower level spare
parts are necessary. Test and support equipment requirements are limited to that
necessary for initial system check-out and ready-for-use certification. No maintenance
test equipment is required. Low personnel skills will suffice since maintenance is
limited to a remove and replace function. Maintenance manuals are simple and unit
maintenance is not covered. Choosing this support method implies that the cost of
spare units and disposal is cheaper than repairing the system to a ready for use
condition.
Although throw-away policies for reparable type items are generally perceived
as wasteful, this concept should not be discarded based solely on tangible cost analysis.
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During periods of conflict, the throw-away concept could become more mission
effective than using a peacetime repair concept. This decision would be influenced by
the mission, timing, etc., as well as other factors such as the availability of
transportation, and production capability of the industrial base.
If the system is not to be discarded upon failure during peacetime, a repair
concept must include one of the other three support methods. However, when a total
discard-upon-failure or throw-away concept is used in peace time, as well as wartime,
there will be no impact on the cataloging system because there will be no support
items to enter the system. Further, no impact is envisioned in other logistical areas
solely because of NDI acquisitions. Configuration control is not an issue since a new
procurement will only specify system requirements to form, fit, function, and internal
design changes will not matter. In fact, buying to the existing commercial market will
ensure obtaining the latest technology, but could impact training due to introduction of
new models.
2. Total Contractor Support (TCS)
This method involves establishing contractual responsibility for all system
maintenance with a contractor. If an item fails, the Government simply notifies the
contractor and the contractor restores the equipment to working order. The price for
this service is considerable but the benefits are also large. Namely, the Government
is protected from the risk of any failure for the life of the maintenance agreement. In
this method, reliability trade-offs for maintainability should be reflected in the price of
the maintenance contract. In other words, if the developer of the system has made it
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easy to repair, (and as a result, a little less reliable) the charges for maintenance
support should reflect this condition.
Total contractor support will work well for systems that are too expensive to
discard upon failure, but for other reasons, an organic support capability is not
desirable. In systems where the relative frequency of failures is low, total contractor
maintenance may be appropriate.
As it was for the throw-away method, the logistic requirements for this method
are not significant. Spare units for the system are stored on site or held by the
contractor. The Government would not require tools or test equipment. The contractor
provides certification of ready for use for the systems. The contractor would perform
repair on the government site or the unit could be moved to the contractor's site for
repair.
There are some characteristics common to equipment that is best supported by
total contractor support. Equipment that is too expensive to repair on a small scale is
typical for systems supported by total contractor maintenance. These systems will also
tend to be relatively reliable as a population. This support method is also appropriate
for systems with especially high salvage and scrap value.
The mission requirements of the system greatly influence the decision to have
all supply and maintenance support performed by a contractor. A total contractor
support concept is more applicable for systems operating in a non-combat environment.
In this support scenario, DOD would not provision for any spares and repair parts nor
develop any maintenance strategy. No new items would enter the inventory. However,
the program manager must consider impacts in other logistic areas when this method
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is chosen. In accepting total dependency on the contractor for support means accepting
risks of excessive costs, quality instability (internal design changes and substitute
components), untimely and inadequate support, and system upgrade to costly later
models/designs which offer no basic mission advantages. DOD's ability to control
system configuration declines as we move away from military designed systems.
The commodity area also greatly influences the support concept decision.
Contractor support may be the best option in high technology areas where maintaining
the state-of-the-art is critical, e.g., computers and associated peripherals and software.
The Air Force has found that traditional methods of logistics support are not
appropriate for their commercial computer systems. The proliferation and exponential
growth of commercial computer systems in the Air Force demand support techniques
that are prompt and maintenance effective without being cost prohibitive. The Navy
has experienced a similar change of heart in its LOGMARS program. This case is
presented in Chapter V. The LOGMARS system in the Navy expanded to the point
that TCS was too expensive. By changing the support to a Mix of organic and
contractor support and having the contractor charge for repair on a per-incident basis,
the Navy reduced its annual support budget for LOGMARS from $590,000 to
$163,000.
3. Organic Support (OS)
In this method, the Government develops a complete support program and
solely bears the risk for system failure. In this support method, the Government
performs all levels of maintenance on the system. The investment for this support
method can be very large. but it may also be less expensive and more effective than
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the other methods. To develop an organic support capability, the Government would
need to invest in the facilities and equipment necessary for the repair. Additionally,
the Government would need to obtain the technical engineering data for the system.
This information would be necessary for many parts of the logistic support program.
The data provides the basis for training system operators and maintenance persons. It
also would be necessary for establishing sources for spare components and parts.
Technical data is also the source of the maintenance plan. Additionally, the logistic
support analysis process makes use of the technical data.
Once the program manager obtains the technical data, it would have to be used
to generate all those items just listed. These items are necessary for developing an
organic support capability.
The organic support capability is not the proper choice for every system. Nor
is it even the choice given first consideration. Actually, this method is reserved for
those systems that have relatively high failure rates and a large population. Also , the
requirement would need to exist for a long time to justify the investment.
Additionally, and quite obviously, the system would have to be repairable or offer some
value in salvage or scrap. Although the other factors are significant in choosing an
organic support method, a very important factor is when the system is needed. If the
system is needed for a future application, the Government will have time to develop
an organic capability. For requirements that must be met immediately, the organic
support method will be difficult to establish in a short time.
Organic support has long been the preferred method for the Navy. Organic
support in some cases will still be the best and most viable support option for NDI
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systems. However, trade-off analyses must be made. The mission requirement
influences the degree of configuration management (design stabi!'tv) req.. aed which
influences the support concept. Systems operating in a hostile environment generally
must be ruggedized or militarized to improve reliability and sustair*Uiiity. Traditional
logistics presupposes that organic support is the mandatory option. Again, this may
be true for some systems and generally can be accomplished for all systems if cost is
not a consideration. But realistically, DOD managers must recognize that efficient and
effective organic support depends on their ability to influence system design and parts
selection. Otherwise, we accept the risk of costly sole source parts supply, including
maintenance manuals and testing equipment or costly acquisition, if available, of
technical data and a system design freeze to a baseline with additional costs to
maintain a production base.
4. Organic and Contractor Support Mix IMix)
This method of support combines two previously discussed support methods.
It seeks to take advantage of the benefits of both total contractor and organic support
methods while avoiding some of the disadvantages of each. This method involves
sharing the risk of system failure between the Government and the contractor. In this
support method, the maintenance responsibilities may be shared in any manner that is
beneficial to the Government. Typically, the Government as the user, assumes the
organizational maintenance tasks. These tasks normally include inspection, servicing,
lubrication, adjustment, and the removal and replacement of parts, minor assemblies and
sub-assemblies.
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Also typical in a mixed support method is the contractor being assigned the
depot maintenance function. Depot maintenance is those tasks that are beyond the
capability of the lower levels of maintenance. Its tasks include inspection, test,repair,
modification, alteration, modernization and overhaul of the system.
The intermediate maintenance tasks may be assigned either to the Government
or the contractor in a mixed system. Typically, the Government would take
responsibility for intermediate maintenance tasks if the capability already exists within
the supporting activities or if the capability is easily obtained. Otherwise, the
contractor would be assigned these tasks. The intermediate maintenance level tasks are
calibration, repair or replacement of damaged or unserviceable parts, components, or
sub-assemblies and providing technical support to the organizational activities.
This support method would be best for those systems that do not fall into the
throw-away category, but are also not best served by a total contractor support method.
These systems might have enough failures to justify some organic capability but a
complexity that makes an organic method difficult.
A contractor and organic support combination allows for variations in the type
and degree of support provided by each. As an example, all maintenance beyond
simple organizational diagnostic tests could be performed by the contractor using
government supplied parts. In this case, DOD has inventory management of spares and
repair parts but does not have any maintenance responsibility. Configuration control
is important here in order to reduce the variety of items or systems entering the supply
system. This support mix would be more applicable to long life cycle systems not
subject to rapid state-of-the-art technology changes.
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In the reverse situation, where the contractor supplies the parts and DOD
performs the maintenance, configuration control would be difficult and controlled by
the contractor; however, standardization and stabilization of maintenance processes and
manuals would be controlled by the Government.
A phased support schedule can also be considered a support combination mix.
In this instance, initial support is provided by the contractor until the system is
smoothly transitioned to organic support or to a support mix. Normally, timing
considerations would be the primary force behind a phased support decision.
C. VARIABLES AFFECTING THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT DECISION
The selection of the "best" method for supporting the NDI system will vary
depending on a number of factors that exist in the acquisition program. The existence
of these factors (i.e., decision variables) presents the program manager with a difficult,
multi-faceted decision situation. He must consider the strengths and weaknesses of
each support method in relation to the influence of the variables in the acquisition
program.
In order to assist the program manager in logically and systematically selecting the
optimal support method, an evaluation model is needed. The model should rank each
of the support techniques against each of the decision variables. Then, by objectively
evaluating the influence of each of the variables, the program manager can make a
choice of which method of support to use in his program. At a minimum, one or two
methods may be shown to be clearly superior to the others, which makes the decision
easier.
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The next section presents such a model. Before describing the model, the decision
variables on which the model is based and the general impact which each of the
variables has on the feasibility of logistic support must be understood. Two types of
factors influence the support method decision. The first type of factors are the system
use factors (i.e., how, where, when, why and how long is the system used) [Ref. 8:p.
11]. The second type of factors are system specific factors. These factors would
include the system's availability, unit cost, population, complexity and maintenance
concept. An explanation of these factors is contained in Chapter III.
D. THE MODEL
The Support System Decision Matrix (SSDM) shown on the following pages is
heuristic in nature. Its objective is to provide a logical and systematic framework for
evaluating the applicability of each of the support methods in light of the variables
present in the acquisition process. The end result of the evaluation process will be (at
best) the selection of the optimal support technique. At worst, the model should serve
to eliminate one or more support techniques from further consideration. In that case,
the decision situation will have been simplified and certain variables should emerge as
being critical, thereby, suggesting the areas which need further investigation or
consideration.
1. Format of the model
The SSDM lists the 10 decision variables vertically on the left. Each of these
variables is divided into two or three categories (e.g., high-medium-low, yes-no) to
allow the model to be tailored to the refinements of a given acquisition situation.
Across the top of the model are listed the logistic support methods. It should be noted
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that the four methods, (NS, TCS, OS, and Mix) when placed in that order, represent
a line of continuum with respect to coordination required to achieve a successful
support program.
2. Effectiveness Factors
The model rates the effectiveness of each of the methods with respect to the
decision variables. A simple three point system of "+", "0", or "-" is used to denote
whether a given method is particularly strong, neutral, or weak with respect to each of
the variables. In addition, an "X" is used to denote a situation where the use of a
given method is particularly inappropriate, or, to caution that particular care should be
given in applying a given method in that situation. An "*", on the other hand,
indicates that the method is particularly well suited to the situation under consideration.
The three point system is used because of the non-quantifiable nature of the
model. The purpose of the model is to guide the program manager in choosing among
the methods. It is not intended to provide an elaborate quantification scheme or to
replace experience and judgement.
E. DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL'S WEIGHTINGS
1. Degree of Militarization
This factor indicates the extent of change that was necessary for the NDI to
be made able to fdl its military mission. The more changes that are incorporated into
the NDI system, the less the contractor's standard support services will be sufficient
or economical. This would drive the system towards a contractor-organic mix, or a
total organic support method if the change were large.
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2. Environment
This factor is divided into two categories: hostile and benign. If the NDI
system is to be used in direct combat operations, a total contractor support method may
be impossible. It would be difficult to bring a contractor into a combat environment
to provide service. But a total contractor maintenance service is not impossible--
systems can be removed from the battlefield to a more benign environment. The
benign environment favors total contractor support. The cost of this service in a
benign environment would not include the cost of training support persons in combat
techniques. But combat training may be part of the cost for organic support.
3. Operating Cycle
Long operating cycles for systems usually indicate a mission of a routine,
ongoing nature. For systems that fall into this description, service cycles can be
planned in advance, which makes total contractor support easier than for systems with
short cycles. Short operating cycles generally, but not always, indicate intermittent,
randomly scheduled missions. Also, these systems tend to spend a great deal of time
in stand-by status. For these systems, support services can not be conveniently
scheduled in advance. Systems with short operating cycles are better served with an
organic system.
4. Application
This factor indicates whether the NDI system is being procured to meet a
present requirement or if the system will meet some future need. For systems meeting
an urgent need, for a present requirement, an organic support capability may not be
possible. An organic capability may take several years to establish. These systems
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may be forced to be supported by a throw-away policy. For systems being procured
for a future requirement, the organic system may be established.
5. Criticality
This factor describes the relationship between the NDI system and the primary
system. For systems that are a major contributor the primary mission of a war-fighting
unit, the organic support method will probably best serve this system. As the criticality
factor moves from secondary mission or back-up, finally to administrative, the support
method may be changed to a contractor mix, total contractor support, or throw-away.
6. Availability
High system availability tends to make a no-support system or a total
contractor maintenance program more effective. As system availability decreases, an
organic system or a mix of organic and contractor support is more effective.
7. Cost
All other things being equal, high unit cost means the system must be repaired
on failure. But high unit cost alone does not indicate which of the other three support
methods will be preferred. Systems with high costs will be supported in some fashion.
Conversely, low unit cost is better served by a throw-away system.
8. Population
This factor, with reliability, are very important factors in determining the
support method for a system. As a system's reliability decreases and its population
increases, the number of broken systems needing repair increases. At some point, it
is more economical to develop an organic repair capability for a system. When the
system population is small, it is usually more efficient to discard the system when it
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fails or hire the contractor to support the system. As the population increases, all other
things being equal, it becomes more efficient to develop partial or full organic
capability.
9. Complexity
Organic support is limited by the specialty structure of the service. If the
skills necessary for the support of the system are not easily provided from the existing
rate structure, the service must rely on commercial support. The return on the
investment for developing an organic repair capability on simple items is easier to
achieve than the return for repairing complex items.
10. Maintenance Level
This factor describes the level of maintenance where the majority of system
repair will occur. When most of the maintenance man-hours are expended at the
organizational or user level, then a NS system would be favored. For repairable
systems that require higher levels of maintenance, such as the intermediate (I level) or
depot level (D level) for repairs, then some level of support is required.
For systems that are mostly repaired at the I level or D level, a Mixed support
system would be preferred. In the case where most of the repair occurred at the I
level, the Government would develop an organic I level capability and contract the D
level.
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter presented the Support System Decision Model (SSDM). This simple
heuristic weighs only ten characteristics of the system under consideration and each
factor is weighted equally. In other words, it considers the degree of militarization to
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be equally as important to the support system decision as system availability. In some
cases, this may be an erroneous assumption. It is important to understand that this
model must be used with discretion and should not be the sole criteria in picking a
support method. A demonstration of how this model may be used in presented in
Chapter V.
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SUPPORT SYSTEM DECISION MATRIX
Factors Support, Method
NS TCS OS MIX
Degree of High 0 0 + +
Militarization Low 0 + 0 0
Environment Hostile * + 0
Benign 0 + 0 0
Operating Long - 0 0 +
Cycle Short 0 + + 0
Application Present 0 0 X 0
Future 0 + + +
Criticality Essential - - + 0
Important 0 0 + 0
Accessory + + 0 +
Availability High + 0 0 0
Low 0 + * +
Cost High - 0 + +
Low + - -
Population High - *
Low + + -
Complexity Complex 0 + +
Simple - - +
Maintenance 0 Level 0 -
Level I&D Level - + 0 +
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V. CASE STUDY
The following case provides an illustration of a system procured as an NDI. It
demonstrates some of the advantages, disadvantages and other considerations discussed
throughout this thesis.
A. LOGISTIC APPLICATIONS OF AUTOMATED MARKING AND READING
SYMBOLS (LOGMARS)
LOGMARS is the Logistic Application of Automated Marking and Reading Symbols
in management information systems. From over 40 candidate symbologies, the
Department of Defense chose the 3-of-9 bar code (3 of the 9 elements are wide and
the remaining 6 narrow) as its standard [Ref. 9:p. 1]. This code has full alpha-numeric
capabilities and is self-checking and discrete. It provides for 44 data characters, each
of which consists of 5 bars and 4 spaces, for a total of 9 elements. It is also
inexpensive and machine readable. It makes possible the rapid, accurate transfer of
data; eliminates punch-cards and paperwork; and permits direct input of data to existing
computer systems [Ref. 10:p. 71.
1. Background
The Department of Defense purchased LOGMARS in May 1982 from Ibis
Corporation. The U.S. Army Computer Systems Selection and Acquisition Agency
issued the contract which provides for hardware, hardware maintenance, software,
software maintenance, training, and documentation. The Navy used the contract to buy
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almost $8 million dollars worth of equipment. The majority of the items were portable
bar code readers.
The equipment bought on the Ibis contract is typical of commercially available
bar code readers, scanning devices, and printers. In general, the equipment is quite
reliable. The bar code readers and other electronic equipment are largely of solid-
state construction and have few moving parts. This design lends itself to a high degree
of reliability and relatively few maintenance tasks can be performed at the
organizational or intermediate level. The label printers are impact-type printers and,
because they are mechanical, they require more maintenance. The estimated life
expectancy of the aggregate of the equipment was expected to be 10 years.
As the number and dollar value of these systems being installed throughout the
Navy began to grow quite large, the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP)
decided to assess the support program for this system. LOGMARS equipment was not
designed or developed to a system specification, but procured off-the-shelf. The
Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) Plan was formulated in the absence of maintainability,
reliability and other support data normally provided in a ful development program.
The Navy LOGMARS program is managed by the LOGMARS Program
Management Office (PMO) at NAVSUP 0613. This office develops the Navy
LOGMARS policy. In 1986, the program office determined these problems with the
LOGMARS program:
1. Equipment maintenance was costing the Government over $500.000 dollars
a year. This maintenance is being performed by Ibis, the only designated
depot for this equipment.
2. Four years into the program's life and the Navy supply system had not yet
started to carry parts and supplies for the LOGMARS. Most activities bought
necessary items from local sources and usage data had not been maintained.
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3. There was no central repository for LOGMARS technical data. No office
wa; charged with making sure the users and maintainers had complete and
current technical data.
After reviewing the program and identifying the support problems, the Navy
LOGMARS Program Office had to consider several options. The program office could
continue to fund total contractor support at a cost of over $500,000 per year; they
could develop an organic capability within the Navy to support the system at some
unknown cost; or, they could consider some mix of organic and contractor support for
the system. Since LOGMARS equipment was designed for commercial application and
support, the scope of the analysis focused on those elements that could be addressed





A maintenance plan establishes the responsibilities, support levels and repair
policies required to maintain a desired level of equipment or system availability. In
general, there are three basic levels of maintenance.
Organizational maintenance: Tasks that are performed at the user level and are
normally limited to component replacement, preventative maintenance, and simple
corrective maintenance.
Intermediate maintenance: Tasks that are beyond the organizational capability
and usually include removal and replacement of major assemblies or parts.
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Depot maintenance: Tasks that usually include restoration, overhaul, or
rebuilding of equipment.
At the time of the analysis, equipment maintenance was included in the Ibis
contract. The contract allowed for only two levels of maintenance for LOGMARS
equipment: (1) the organizational level of maintenance, which is prescribed in the
vendor's literature and performed by the user, and (2) depot level maintenance, which
is performed by the contractor, at either the government site or on the contractor's site.
And even though the contract specified organizational level maintenance, it was only
the action of calling the contractor when a failure occurred. Contract maintenance was
charged as a set fee on a monthly basis.
In considering the options, establishing an organic capability was almost
immediately discounted. There were several reasons for eliminating organic support
as an option. First, the LOGMARS equipment was actually quite reliable and depot
level support facility for the number of systems the Navy had was not justified.
Another important reason was the time required to convert to an in-house maintenance
program. Collecting repair cost data, determining manpower needs, establishing
positions, and providing training and equipment would take an estimated 4 years. With
an anticipated service life of 10 years, the equipment already purchased and fielded
would barely have any useful life by the time support could be achieved.
Continuing total contractor support was another consideration for the program
office. The contract maintenance agreement requires the contractor to assume full
responsibility for repair costs. If an item fails, the Government simply notifies the
contractor, and the contractor does whatever is needed to restore the equipment to
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working order. The price for this service is considerable. The benefit is also
considerable, in that it allows the Government to divest itself of any risk of failure
for the life of the maintenance agreement.
The final consideration was finding some mix of contractor and organic support
that was acceptable to the program office. By default, this was to be the method of
support chosen. Organic support was not feasible because of the long period necessary
to establish it, and total contractor support was too expensive.
To achieve a mix, the using activities needed to assume a greater role in the
support of the system. As a result, organizational maintenance was redefined to include
diagnosis, replacement, calibration, and adjustment of the equipment. Additionally, they
would use the contractor's telephone consultation service to confirm and diagnose
malfunctions and identify possible solutions. Items identified as not repairable at the
organizational level would be either returned to the contractor or repaired on site by
the contractor. Items determined after consultation with the contractor to be un-
repairable would be disposed of at the organizational level.
Depot mairtenance would only include major component repair or calibration
beyond the capability of organizational maintenance. All work done by the contractor
would be charged to the Government on an agreed-upon hourly rate.
3. Supply Support
Supply support consists of all material and catalog data required to sustain a
system's operations and support. It include -epair parts, spares, provisioning, storage,
cataloging and consumable supplies. In th case of LOGMARS equipment, supply
support was largely confined to consumable supplies, such as print wheels, ribbons and
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repair parts. Though the organic maintenance support for LOGMARS equipment is
limited, items listed in the manufacturer's literature as replaceable by the user can be
stocked by the using activity. These activities are now supplied largely from local
procurement and the General Services Administration (GSA) schedule.
Ideally, the LOGMARS PMO should have taken steps to catalog and capture
demand for these supplies. The data could have then been submitted for inclusion in
the standard Navy supply system. Standardizing supplies within the wholesale supply
system would enhance availability and reduce processing time. Since the production
contract for the next family of LOGMARS equipment may be awarded to a different
manufacturer, it would be helpful as an interim measure for the LOGMARS PMO to
publish a list of acceptable supplies and sources of supply for distribution to the users.
To ensure availability of equipment for shipboard and other critical LOGMARS
systems, an equipment maintenance float should be considered. A maintenance float
stock is a quantity of spares or components kept as a standby to prevent downtime
when primary equipment is evacuated from the using activity for repair. The
LOGMARS PMO should assist the Applications Program Developers in determining
the float requirement.
4. Technical Data
Technical data is the documentation for operation, maintenance, and support of
a system. There is no central repository of this information for Navy LOGMARS
systems. The LOGMARS PMO established a database of information on the system
and maintains technical manuals for all system components. Establishing and
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maintaining a central office for this data provides a single source of information for
all system users and system designers.
B. ANALYSIS
LOGMARS is a case where the Navy purchased a system off the shelf with little
regard for the logistic support of the system. After fielding almost eight million dollars
worth of equipment, the program office found the annual support costs for this system
approaching $600,000. Weighing the factors of the program--factors that form the basis
of the Support System Decision Matrix (SSDM) in Chapter IV--the program office
considered the possible alternatives for support and chose a mix of organic and
contractor support. The LOGMARS case is now evaluated using the SSDM developed
in Chapter IV. The results are displayed in Exhibit 1.
I. System Use Factors
a. How Is The System Used?
This questions asks how the system is used compared to the purpose for
which it was originally designed. In this case, LOGMARS is used exactly as it is used
in the commercial market. Its degree of militarization is low. Therefore, ignoring all
other factors, a Total Contractor Support (TCS) method would be favored. It is also
noted that this factor is weighted neutrally against the remaining support systems:
No Support (NS), Organic Support (OS), and a mix of organic and contractor support
(Mix).
b. Where Is The System Used?
Where the system is used describes the environment in which the system is
operated and maintained. LOGMARS operates in a warehouse atmosphere under
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benign conditions. Operation in a hostile environment is not expected and does not
effect the support decision. This factor favors all the support systems except NS. The
benign environment is neutral to the No Support decision.
c. How Long Is The System Used?
This factor describes the operating cycle for the system. LOGMARS has a
long operating cycle reflective of its routine, ongoing mission. The long operating
cycle of LOGMARS indicates that the Navy should consider some form of organic
support, either a complete organic system or a mix of contractor and organic support.
The model weights TCS neutrally and indicates NS is not favorable.
d. When Is The System Used?
This question asks if the system supports a present requirement or a future
one. The more urgent the requirement is, the more difficult it is to establish an
organic support capability for the early life of the system. In this case, an NDI
strategy was chosen, in part, to get a working system in Navy warehouses quickly.
This meant that any organic support would have to be phased in--brought in gradually.
Initial requirements that could not be met with present organic capability would have
to be met with contractor support.
e. Why Is The System Used?
This question weighs the criticality of the system to the mission of the user.
LOGMARS is essential to the success of the warehouses that use the system. When
the system fails, the user is forced to use a manual system that all but brings service
to a halt. TCS could be used but is not favored because of the high cost that goes
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with keeping an essential system up and operating. An OS is the best support system
for critical systems. The model weighs a Mixed system as neutral.
SUPPORT SYSTEM DECISION MATRIX FOR LO(;MARS
Factors Support Method
NS TCS OS MIX
Degree of Low 0 + 0 0
Militarization
Environment Benign 0 + 0 0
Operating Long - 0 0 +
Cycle
Application Present 0 0 X 0
Criticality Essential - - + 0
Availability High + 0 0 0
Cost High - 0 + +
Population High - -* 0
Complexity Complex 0 + - +
Maintenance I&D Level - + 0 +
Level
SUMMARY:
• 0 0 1 0
+ 1 4 2 4
0 4 4 5 6
5 2 1 0
X 0 0 1 0
Score: 
-4 2 1 4
Exhibit I
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2. System Specific Factors
a. System Availability
As noted in Chapter IV, LOGMARS enjoys high availability. The designer
was able to employ many techniques to improve reliability of the system. Also, the
system is operated in a benign environment and the equipment is normally protected
from damage due to weather, improper handling and other forms of mistreatment.
Ignoring all other factors, high system availability is best suited for a throw-away
support system. But high availability does not detract from the other forms of support
and these are weighted neutrally by the SSDM.
b. System Cost
System cost is the major factor that eliminates NS as a support system.
Compared to major systems, such as aircraft or ships, LOGMARS may seem to be a
relatively inexpensive system. However, in the context of warehousing costs, it
represents a large capital expense, second only to the building and land. Also, the
more expensive the system, the more it becomes cost-effective for the Navy to develop
an organic capability for repair. This factor indicates that either a OS or a Mixed
support system would be more beneficial.
c. System Population
System population for LOGMARS is high on a Navy-wide level, yet the
number of equipment at each site is relatively low. The weighting of this factor shows
the Navy should consider developing some organic support capability. This factor
indicates TCS and NS are not favored.
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d. System Complexity
This factor must be considered in the context of the equipment normally
repaired and supported by warehouse personnel. Although LOGMARS is not a
technically complicated system, it is very complex compared to other equipment in the
warehouse. An OS system would require special training and tools for the support
persons. Therefore, some support will be required from the contractor, either TCS or
a Mixed system.
e. System Maintenance Concept
The System Maintenance Concept factor describes the level at which the
majority of maintenance is performed. The majority of maintenance for LOGMARS
is conducted at the intermediate and depot level. Alone, this factor indicates a
requirement for a repair capability. It is also understood that the contractor can
normally provide this level of maintenance at a lower cost then an organic system.
This is due to the high cost of establishing training, equipment and supply support for
the OS.
C. CONCLUSION
Analysis of the support decision for the LOGMARS system using the SSDM shows
that a Mix of contractor and organic support is clearly favored over the other methods.
The most significant factors are the benign environment, the long operating cycle, the
high cost and large population. Total Contractor Support and Organic Support rank a
distant second. The high cost and large population indicate that Organic Support would
be cost effective and the complexity and benign environment favor Contractor support.
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As discussed in Chapter IV, the relative weightings of the factors are equal.
Therefore, the recommended alternative can be determined by simply adding the
numbers of "+", "-", "0", "', and "X" for each method. Another method that might
be used is to determine which method is "dominate" over the other methods. This
analysis involves comparing each method to the others by the factors to determine
which is "dominate". For example, comparing TCS to NS, each factor is relatively
more favorable in the TCS method over the NS method except for the Availability
factor. In other words, comparing the methods factor by factor, TCS is equal or more
favored to NS. For Degree of Militarization, Environment, and complexity TCS ranks
"+" to "0" for NS. Each factor can be compared in turn to show that TCS dominates
NS for all factors except availability.
Relative rankings of the model may be argued and choosing the category for each
factor is subject to judgement. The point of the model is to first, demonstrate the
nany factors in the support decision. Second, many of these factors are interrelated
arid must be judged in the context of the specific application under consideration.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis examined the logistic support concepts for Non-Developmental Items
(NDIs). The research focused on how system use factors and system specific factors
affect the decisions on how to support the system. The result of this research is the
Support System Decision Model (SSDM) presented in Chapter IV. The goal of this
thesis has been to serve as a basis for establishing Department of the Navy guidelines
for NDI logistic support and to help decision makers in choosing a logistic support
system best suited for their program. The conclusions that can be drawn from this
study are listed below:
1. The NDI method of procurement has an important place in the Navy's
acquisition programs.
2. The decision regarding the use of NDI is made early in the program.
3. The shortened acquisition cycle of NDI's adversely impacts that system's
logistic support.
4. System use factors and system specific factors are the best indicators of which
support system to choose fot an NDI.
5. The decision makers must choose the support system as early as possible in
the acquisition program.
I. NDIs Important Role
The NDI method of procurement has an important place in the Navy's
acquisition programs. The effect of using NDI in the acquisition varies from case to
case. In each case, NDI offers some advantages and some disadvantages over a normal
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development program. The benefits attributed to NDI include lower costs, shorter
acquisition cycles and speeding current technology to the field. NDI also poses some
problems to the acquisition cycle. Every procurement is different and each situation
must be studied to find how NDI can help the program.
2. Choose NDi Strategy Early
The decision regarding using NDI is made early in the program. An NDI
strategy is the only way to meet some requirements. In this case, the acquisition
manager will concentrate on finding the best commercial market solution to meet the
mission need. Even when the program ,m.anager is not directed to use an NDI solution,
it is among the alternatives that are continuously reviewed during system development.
3. NDI's Detriment to Logistics
The most significant drawback of using an NDI to meet a mission need is the
detrimental impact to the logistic support system created by the lack of program time
to evaluate requirements. NDI programs are special because they shorten the
acquisition cycle. Selection of commercial items also reduces the interval between
production award and initial delivery of the entire system to the user. Under the
accelerated conditions of an NDI program, the time required to prepare, staff, and
approve program management documents, manpower authorizations, and the time
required for establishing a logistic support system is often greater than the time
required to produce and deliver the hardware.
4. System Use and System Specific Factors
In deciding the proper logistic support system for an NDI, the best indicators
are a combination of system use factors and system specific factors. By focusing on
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these factors, decision makers can use the heuristic model in Chapter V to rank the
alternative forms of supporting their system.
5. Early Decision
Finally, as in many other program decisions, the choice of a logistic support
method must be made as early as possible in the program. As already mentioned, NDI
programs lack the time for a detailed logistic support analysis and the program manager
must rely on the research and development information gathered by the commercial
developer. Delaying the support decision compounds the problem of having the support
system in place for the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of the system.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
As a result of this research, the following recommendations are presented:
1. Continue to emphasize the use of NDI as a primary acquisition strategy.
2. Ensure that NDI systems are held to the same standards for quality of logistic
support when being fielded.
3. Defense Systems Management College (DSMC) should complete the effort on
the NDI Handbook.
1. NDI as an Acquisition Strategy
Many instructions regarding acquisition require decision makers to consider
NDI as part of the acquisition strategy. This requirement must continue to be
emphasized for all levels of the Department of Defense (DOD). Of course the
acquisition strategy must reflect the complexity and scope of the program, but every
effort must be made to fully exploit the available commercial solutions to military
requirements. DOD cannot duplicate the efficiency of the free market in designing
solutions to its problems. However, program managers at all levels should only begin
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a full scale development program when it has been satisfactorily determined that the
commercial market cannot meet the needs of the requirement.
2. Equal Standards of Quality
Logistic support is a critical part of the effectiveness of every program. The
legitimate desire of decision makers to field systems as soon as possible rushes the
development of a logistic support system. This problem is especially profound in an
NDI procurement. Yet logistic support requirements must receive the same
consideration given to performance requirements and delivery schedules by program
managers. The fact that an NDI procurement strategy allows a system to be fielded
faster or more cheaply must not be used as justification for fielding a system without
a support system.
3. Finish the NDI Handbook
The 1986 Packard Commission Report increased the emphasis on NDI
procurement for all levels of DOD. The initial draft provides a wealth of information
on the DOD's acquisition policy on NDI's. The manual defines NDI, explains how
NDI acquisition can be tailored within the systems acquisition process and lists factors
to consider when developing an NDI acquisition strategy. The responsible offices
should complete the preparation of this manual and distribute it as widely among
acquisition persons as is possible.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The following issues were raised during the research and are recommended for
further study:
1. Are special or abbreviated rules for acquisition of commercial products
justified?
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2. Do NDI's have a special ability to take advantage of competitive market
forces?
3. What are the risks and effects of "end item proliferation" as a result of
emphasis on NDI acquisition strategy?
I. Special Rules
Many documentation and analysis requirements in the DOD's acquisition
program do not apply to products the are already developed. For example, Human
Factors Analysis will not affect a system that is already being produced. These
requirements are costly and add little to the quality of the system. There is significant
room for elimination of requirements for commercial products. A study would focus
on the need for a special set of acquisition regulations for buying commercial
equipment.
2. NDI in the Competitive Market
Recent studies have indicated that the artificial competition created by
establishing a second source for major defense systems may not provide any of the
benefits of a natural competitive market. Conversely, NDI's have some unique
characteristics to take advantage of competitive market forces. Research should focus
on how NDI programs are effected by competition and how multiple sources benefit
the Government.
3. End Item Proliferation
Many programs exist in DOD to protect against the effects of end item
proliferation. These programs include the DOD Parts Control Program, the DOD
Interchangeability and Substitutability System and the Defense Standardization and
Specification Program. The effects of this proliferation on military readiness is not
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understood. Since the cataloging systems designed to minimize proliferation are
dependent on technical data, the research would compare the support items for the NDI




I. What is your activity's definition of a commercial/non developmentA.l item (NDI)
system?
2. How does the NDI acquisition differ from an acquisition on a system with a full
development?
3. Was an NDI solution to the acquisition process mandated or was it reached as a
result of the acquisition process?
4. At what point in the acquisition process, if any, was an NDI solution considered?
5. What were the major advantages gained by using the NDI?
6. What were the costs involved in using the NDI?
7. What do you see as the major impact of NDI on logistical support?
8. How can logistic support for NDI systems be improved?
9. What support system is best suited for supporting the NDI, organic, commercial,
a mix, or no support at all?
10. What program characteristics affect how the system will be supported?
11. What system use characteristics affect how the system will be supported?





Affordability is the degree to which the system's costs can be borne by the
procuring activity.
Availability
Availability is the measure of the degree a system is in the operable and
committable state at the start of a mission when the mission is called for at an
unknown, random time. This is often called "operational readiness." It is the
probability that the system is operating satisfactorily at any point in time when used
under stated conditions, where the total time considered includes operating time, active
repair time, administrative time and logistics time.
Depot Maintenance
Depot maintenance is performed by designated maintenance activities on segmented
stocks of serviceable material. Depot maintenance support, organizational maintenance,
and intermediate maintenance activities are accomplished by the use of the more
extensive shop facilities, equipment, and personnel of higher technical skill than are
available at the lower levels of maintenance. Its phases normally consist of inspection,
test, repair, modification, alteration, modernization, and overhaul of weapons systems
and parts. Depot maintenance is normally accomplished in fixed ships, shipyards, and
other shore-based facilities, or by depot field teams.
Integrated Logistic Support
Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) is a management function that provides the initial
planning, funding and controls which help to assure that the ultimate consumer or user
will receive a system that will not only meet performance requirements. but one that
can be expeditiously and economically supported throughout its programmed life cycle.
A major objectie of ILS is to assure the integration of the various elements of
support. Included within ILS is the development of a preliminary logistic support plan
during the conceptual design phase and a formal integrated logistic support plan (ILSP)
during the advanced development phase.
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Intermediate Maintenance
Intermediate maintenance is the responsibility of and is performed by designated
maintenance activities for support of using organizations. Its phases normally consist
of calibration, and repair or replacement of damaged or unserviceable parts,
components, or assemblies; the manufacture of critical non-available parts; and
providing technical assistance to using organizations. Intermediate maintenance is
normally accomplished in fixed or mobile ships, tenders, shore-based repair facilities,
or by mobile teams.
Life Cycle Cost
Life Cycle Cost (LCC) involves all costs associated with the system life cycle, to
include:
1. Research and development (R&D) cost - the cost of feasibility studies;
system analyses; detail design and development, fabrication, assembly, and
test of engineering models; initial system test and evaluation; and associated
documentation.
2. Production and construction cost - the cost of fabrication, assembly, and test
of operational systems (production models); operation and maintenance of
the production capability; and associated initial logistic support requirements.
3. Operation and maintenance cost - the cost of sustaining operation, personnel
and maintenance support, spare and repair parts and related inventory costs,
test and support equipment maintenance, transportation and handling,
facilities, modifications and technical data changes.
4. System retirement and phaseout cost - the cost of phasing the system out
of the inventory due to obsolenscence or wearout, and subsequent equipment
item recycling and reclamation as appropriate.
Logistic Support Analysis
Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) is an iterative analytical process by which the
logistic support necessary for a new system is identified and evaluated. LSA constitutes
the application of selected quantitative methods to (1) aid in the initial determination
and establishment of logistic criteria as an input to system design, (2) aid in the
evaluation of various design alternatives, (3) aid in the identification and provisioning
of logistic support elements, and (4) aid in the final assessment of the system support
capability during consumer use. LSA is a design analysis tool employed throughout
the early phase- of system development and often includes the maintenance analysis,
life cycle cos iialysis, and logistics modeling. An output of LSA is the identification
of and justification for logistic support resources. This output is sometimes identified
as the logistic support analysis record (LSAR.)
Maintainability
Maintainability, like reliability, is an inherent characteristic of system design. It
pertains to the ease, accuracy, safety, and economy in the performance of maintenance
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actions. A system should be designed such that it can be maintained without large
investments of time, cost, or other resources (e.g.. personnel, materials, facilities, test
equipment) and without adversely affecting the mission of that system. Maintainability
is the ability of an item to be maintained, whereas maintenance constitutes a series of
actions to be taken to restore or retain an item in an effective operational state.
Maintainability is a result of design.
Maintainability can also be defined as a characteristic in design that can be
expressed in terms of maintenance frequency factors, maintenance times, and
maintenance cost. These terms may be presented as different figures of merit;
therefore, maintainability may be defined on the basis of a combination of factors, such
as:
1. A characteristic of design and installation which is expressed as the
probability that an item will be retained in or restored to a specified
condition within a given period of time, when maintenance is performed in
accordance with prescribed procedures and resources
2. A characteristic of design and installation which is expressed as the
probability that maintenance will not be required more than x times in a
given period, when the system is operated in accordance with prescribed
procedures. This may be analogous to reliability when the latter deals with
the overall frequency of maintenance.
3. A characteristic of design and installation which is expressed as the
probability that the system is maintained in accordance with prescribed
procedures.
Maintainability requires the consideration of many different factors involving all
aspects of the system. Maintainability is an inherent characteristic of design, must be
properly considered in the early phases of system development, and maintainability
activities are applicable throughout the life cycle.
Organizational Maintenance
Organizational maintenance is the responsibility of and is performed by a using
organization on its assigned equipment. Its phases normally consist of inspecting,
servicing, lubricating, adjusting, and the replacement of parts, minor assemblies, and
subassemblies.
i',.Aiability
Reliability is the probability that a system or product will perform in a satisfactory
manner for a given time when used under the specified operating conditions. This
definition stresses the elements of probability, satisfactory performance, time and
specified operating conditions. These four elements are extremely important, since each
plays a significant role in determining system reliability.
Probability, the first element in the reliability definition, is usually stated as a
quantitative expression representing a fraction or a percent signifying the number of
times that an event occurs (successes), divided by the total number of trials. For
instance, a statement that the probability of survival of an item for 80 hours is 0.75
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(or 75%) indicates that we can expect that the item will function properly for at least
80 hours. 75 times out of 100 trials.
When there are a number of supposedly identical items operating under similar
conditions, it can be expected that failures will occur at different points in time; thus,
failures are described in probabilistic terms. In essence, the fundamental definition of
reliability is heavily dependent on the concepts derived from probability theory.
Satisfactory performance, the second element in the reliability definition, indicates
that specific criteria must be established which describes what is considered to be
satisfactory system operation. A combination of qualitative and quantitative factors
defining the functions that the system or product is to accomplish, usually presented
in the context of a system specification, are required.
The third element, time, is one of the most important since it represents a measure
against which the degree of system performance can be related. One must know the
"time" parameter in order to assess the probability of completing a mission or a given
function as scheduled. Of particular interest is being able to predict the probability of
an item surviving (without failing) for a designated period. Also, reliability is
frequently defined in terms of mean time between failure (MTBF), mean time to failure
(MTTF), or mean time between maintenance (MTBM); thus the aspect of time is
critical in reliability measurement.
The specified operating conditions under which we expect a system or product to
function constitute the fourth significant element of the basic reliability definition.
These conditions include environmental factors such as geographical location where the
system is expected to operate, the operational profile, the transportation profile,
temperature cycles, humidity, vibration, shock, and so on. Such factors must not only
address the conditions for the period when the system or product is operating, but the
conditions for the periods when the system (or a portion thereof) is in a storage mode
or being transported from one location to the next. Experience has indicated that the
transportation, handling, and storage modes are sometimes more critical from a
reliability standpoint than the conditions experienced during actual system operational
use.
The four elements discussed above are critical in determining the reliability of a
system. System reliability is a key factor in the frequency of maintenance, and the
maintenance frequency obviously has a significant impact on logistic support
requirements. Reliability predictions and analyses are required as an input to the
logistic support analysis.
Reliability is an inherent characteristic of design. As such, it is essential that
reliability be adequately considered at program inception, and that reliability be
addressed throughout the system life cycle.
Supportability
Supportability relates to the degree to which the system can be supported, both in
terms of the inherent characteristics of prime equipment deqign and the effectiveness
of the overall support capability (i.e., elements of logistic support.) This term is
commonly used in a rather general sense, and its use often implies some degree of




ATE Automatic Test Equipment
CD&V Concept Demonstration and Validation
CECOM Communications-Electronics Command
CE/D Concept Exploration/Definition
DCP Decision Coordinating Paper
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense Directive
DOP Decision Options Paper
F3  Form, Fit and Function
FSD Full Scale Development
ILS Integrated Logistic Support
ILSP Integrated Logistic Support Plan
IOC Initial Operating Capability
LCC Life Cycle Costs
LCDR Lieutenant Commander
LOGMARS Logistic Applications of Automated Marking and Reading Symbols
LSA Logistic Support Analysis




MLDT Mean Logistics Delay Time
MNS Mission Need Statement
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure
MTTR Mean Time To Repair
NAVSUP Naval Supply Systems Command
NDI Non Developmental Item
NS No Support
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OR Operational Requirement
OS Organic Support
OT&E Operational Test and Evaluation
POM Program Objectives Memorandum
PMO Program Management Office
PPBS Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
RAM Reliability, Availability, Maintainability
ROC Required Operational Capability
R&D Research and Development
SCP System Concept Paper
SPAWAR Space and Warfare Systems Command
SSDM Support System Decision Matrix
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TCS Total Contractor Support
TEMP Test and Evaluation Master Plan
TOR Tentative Operational Requirement
WSA Weapon System Architecture
WSE Weapon System Engineering
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